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Outage Constrained Robust Secure
Transmission for MISO Wiretap Channels
Shuai Ma, Mingyi Hong, Enbin Song, Xiangfeng Wang and Dechun Sun
Abstract
In this paper we consider the robust secure beamformer design for MISO wiretap channels. Assume
that the eavesdroppers’ channels are only partially available at the transmitter, we seek to maximize
the secrecy rate under the transmit power and secrecy rate outage probability constraint. The outage
probability constraint requires that the secrecy rate exceeds certain threshold with high probability.
Therefore including such constraint in the design naturally ensures the desired robustness. Unfortunately,
the presence of the probabilistic constraints makes the problem non-convex and hence difficult to solve.
In this paper, we investigate the outage probability constrained secrecy rate maximization problem using
a novel two-step approach. Under a wide range of uncertainty models, our developed algorithms can
obtain high-quality solutions, sometimes even exact global solutions, for the robust secure beamformer
design problem. Simulation results are presented to verify the effectiveness and robustness of the
proposed algorithms.
Index Terms
S. Ma and D. Sun are with the State Key Laboratory of Integrated Services Networks (ISN Lab), Xidian University, Xi’an,
710071, China (e-mail: mashuai@stu.xidian.edu.cn; dechsun@sina.com).
M. Hong (Corresponding author) is with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering University of Minnesota,
Minneapolis, MN 55455, USA (e-mails: mhong@umn.edu).
E. Song is with the Department of Mathematics, Sichuan University, Chengdu 610064, China (e-mail: e.b.song@163.com).
X. Wang is with the Department of Mathematics, Nanjing University, 22 Hankou Road, Nanjing, 210093, China (e-mail:
xfwang.nju@gmail.com).
October 29, 2013 DRAFT
2Physical-layer secrecy, MISO wiretap channel, Robust secrecy beamforming, Chance constraints.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communication is susceptible to eavesdropping due to its broadcast nature. Tradi-
tionally, security is treated in cryptography through data-encryption at the application layer.
However, the open nature of wireless medium and the dynamic topology of mobile networks
may introduce significant challenges to secret key transmission and management [1], [2]. In
comparison to the conventional cryptographic approaches, physical-layer secrecy can achieve
perfect security without using an encryption key. The information-theoretic notion of security is
introduced by Shannon to study secure communication over point-to-point noiseless channels [3].
Wyner defined the secrecy capacity for a wiretap channels as the upper bound of all achievable
rates in which private messages are guaranteed to be decoded by the legitimate receiver, while
being kept perfectly secret from the eavesdropper [4].
In a wiretap channel, to guarantee non-zero secrecy rate, the eavesdropper’s channel should
be worse than the legitimate’s channel [4]. However, this may not always be possible in practical
wireless environment. By utilizing multiple antennas at the transmitter, the dependence on
channel conditions can be greatly reduced. This can be attribute to the extra spatial degrees
of freedom provided by the antennas arrays, which enables the transmitter to further degrade the
reception of the eavesdroppers while at the same time enhance the rate of the desired receiver.
Recently, considerable research has investigated optimization algorithms for improving secrecy
rate in wiretap channels with multiple antennas [5]–[11].
There are roughly two approaches for designing transmission schemes in the presence of
multiple transmit antennas: 1) single-stream transmit beamforming, in which the transmit signal
is steered towards the legitimate receiver, while the power leakage to the eavesdroppers is reduced
at the same time; 2) joint beamforming and artificial noise (AN) generation, in which the transmit
power is split into a data stream and an AN [12]–[15]. The AN is used to generate interference
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3to degrade the reception quality at the eavesdropper. In this paper, we focus on the single-
stream transmit beamforming approach. The secrecy capacity of the multiple-input single-output
(MISO) wiretap channel was proved in [6]. The authors in [7] investigated the fading MISO
wiretap channel, and the analysis was extended to the multi-input multi-output (MIMO) case
in [8]. The secrecy capacity for a Gaussian broadcast channel was computed in [9], where a
multi-antenna transmitter sends independent confidential messages to two users. We note that
all the above results are based on the somewhat unrealistic assumption that the channel state
information (CSI) of both legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper is perfect known to the
transmitter. However, in practice perfect CSI of the legitimate user is already sometimes difficult
to obtain (due to estimation errors or feedback errors), not to mention that of the eavesdroppers.
Naturally, such CSI uncertainty heavily deteriorates the performance of the system [16].
Motivated by this fact, the robust design for physical-layer secrecy with imperfect CSI has
received a lot of attention recently. In [16]–[18], the problem of maximizing the worst-case
secrecy rate under various scenarios was studied, with imperfect eavesdroppers’ CSI (ECSI) and
perfect legitimate receivers’ CSI (LCSI). Under the assumption of norm-bounded uncertainty,
the secrecy rate maximization problem with both imperfect ECSI and imperfect LCSI was
investigated in [19], [20]. It is worth noting that all the above mentioned works focus on bounded
CSI errors using the worst case approach. Although such approach guarantees the performance of
the worst CSI errors scenarios, it often leads to a very conservative design, because the extreme
conditions may rarely occur. On the other hand, the robustness of the design can also be improved
by introducing certain outage probability constraints, which often yields less conservative results.
A detailed characterization of the outage secrecy capacity of slow fading single-input single-
output (SISO) wiretap channels was provided in [21], where only the LCSI is known exactly.
In [22], the authors investigated a single letter characterization of the secrecy capacity of the
single-input multiple-outputs (SIMO) channel and the impact of slow fading on the secrecy
capacity. With imperfect ECSI and perfect LCSI, the authors in [23] proposed to minimize the
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4outage probability of secure transmission for both cases of single-stream transmit beamforming
and AN aided transmit beamforming.
In this paper, we seek to design robust secure beamforming strategies for MISO wiretap
channels under various assumptions on the CSI. In particular, we consider three CSI uncertainty
scenarios: (a) perfect LCSI and statistical ECSI; (b) perfect LCSI and imperfect ECSI, and (c)
imperfect LCSI and imperfect ECSI. Here imperfect CIS refers to the case where the channel lies
in some uncertainty set centered at the true channel; statistical CSI means only the distribution
of the channel is available. In each of the considered cases, the presence of channel uncertainty
leads to the outage event. That is, any given secrecy rate requirement cannot be guaranteed
all the time. Therefore, we focus on studying the secrecy rate maximization problem with a
given secrecy outage probability. In other words, we design robust secure beamformer in a way
that ensures the probability that an outage event occurs is smaller than certain given threshold.
Unfortunately, in general the probabilistic constraints often have no closed-form expressions and
are seldom convex [24], [25].
The main contribution of this paper is the development of a suite of algorithms that handle
the difficult outage probability constraint for all three CSI uncertainty scenarios. Our first step
is to decompose the problem into a sequence of power minimization problems under the se-
crecy outage constraints. Then we propose three new algorithms to solve the resulting outage
probability constrained power minimization problem, one for each scenario:
1) Perfect LCSI and statistical ECSI (Scenario 1): The chance constrained power mini-
mization problem is first equivalently converted into a deterministic problem. For the case
with a single eavesdropper, we derived the optimal solution in closed form, while in the
presence of multiple eavesdroppers, the problem is solved by using semidefinite relaxation
(SDR). Importantly, we show that in the latter case, whenever the original problem is
feasible, the SDR is always tight.
2) Perfect LCSI and imperfect ECSI (Scenario 2): The chance constrained power mini-
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5mization problem is first lifted into high dimensions, and then conservatively transformed
into a convex SDP by using the the Bernstein-type Inequality I [26], [27]. A customized
procedure: Projection Approximation Procedure is then developed to recover a high quality
rank-1 solution of the original problem.
3) Imperfect LCSI and imperfect ECSI (Scenario 3): In this case, there are multiple
types of CSI uncertainties in the chance constraint. We first recombine the CSI errors to
higher dimension. We then conservatively transform the power minimization problem into
a deterministic form by using the the Bernstein-type Inequality II [26]–[29], for which the
SDR is used again to relax the deterministic problem into a convex SDP problem.
Notations: Boldfaced lowercase (resp. uppercase) letters are used to represent vectors (resp.
matrices). All vectors are column vectors. The symbols (·)∗, (·)T , (·)H , CN , Tr (·), ‖·‖, ⊙ and ⊗
denote respectively conjugate, transpose, conjugate transpose, the space of N×1 complex vector,
the trace, the Frobenius norm, the Hadamard product and Kronecker product. Re {·} extracts the
real part of its argument. x ∼ CN (m,V) means that x is complex Gaussian distributed with
mean vector m and covariance matrix V. ρ (A) denotes the largest eigenvalue of the matrix A.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. System Model
Alice
h
1g
K
g
Bob
Eve1
Eve K
Fig. 1. System model.
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6We consider a MISO communication system with a source node (Alice), a destination node
(Bob), and multiple eavesdroppers (Eves), as shown in Fig. 1. Suppose that Alice has Nt transmit
antennas, while both Bob and Eves have a single receive antenna. In this model, Alice sends
private messages to Bob in the presence of Eves, who are able to eavesdrop on the link between
Alice and Bob. Assuming that channels are flat-fading, the signals received by Bob and Eves
are given by
yb (t) = h
Hws (t) + nb (t) , (1a)
ye,k (t) = g
H
k ws (t) + nk (t) , ∀k ∈ K, (1b)
where s (t) is the data stream intended for Bob, with E
{|s (t)|2} = 1; w ∈ CNt is the transmit
beamformer vector for s (t); h ∈ CNt is the channel from Alice to Bob, gk ∈ CNt is the
channel from Alice to the kth Eve; nb (t) and nk (t) are independent identically distributed
(i.i.d.) circularly symmetric complex-valued Gaussian noises: nb (t) ∼ CN (0, δ2b ) and nk (t) ∼
CN (0, δ2e,k); K = {1, 2, ..., K}. The received signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at Bob is given by
SNRb (w) =
E
{∥∥hHws (t)∥∥2}
δ2b
=
∥∥hHw∥∥2
δ2b
. (2)
Likewise, the received SNR at the kth Eve can be expressed as
SNRe,k (w) =
E
{∥∥gHk ws (t)∥∥2}
δ2e,k
=
∥∥gHk w∥∥2
δ2e,k
. (3)
The average transmit power of Alice is
E
{‖ws (t)‖2} = ‖w‖2. (4)
According to [6], [7], the instantaneous secrecy rate is
R =
[
log2 (1 + SNRb (w))−max
k∈K
log2 (1 + SNRe,k (w))
]+
. (5)
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7A commonly used criteria for designing the transmit strategy is to maximize the achievable
secrecy rate, subject to a total power constraint [11]
max
w,R
R (6a)
s.t. log2
(
1 +
∥∥hHw∥∥2
δ2b
)
− log2
(
1 +
∥∥gHk w∥∥2
δ2e,k
)
≥ R, ∀ k ∈ K, (6b)
‖w‖2 ≤ P, (6c)
where P is the given average transmit power limit for Alice.
B. CSI Uncertainty Scenarios
One important factor that affects the above secrecy rate maximization problem is the availabil-
ity of CSI. In most cases, the CSI between Alice and the legitimate receiver Bob can be quite
accurate, as it is usually learned at both the receiver side and the transmitter side by training and
feedback. However, the CSI between Alice and Eve is rarely so, due to the limited cooperation
among them for estimating the channel. As a result, any practical design to achieve high secrecy
rate must take CSI uncertainty into consideration. In this work, we consider the following three
scenarios that cover a wide range of CSI uncertainties.
1) Scenario 1: Perfect LCSI and statistical ECSI: We first consider a scenario that often
arises in practice, in which Eves are not part of the legitimate system, hence their channels
are not known. That is, Alice knows the full CSI of the channel h but only some statistical
information about ECSI [6], [10]:
gk ∼ CN (0,Gk) , ∀k ∈ K, (7)
where Gk ≻ 0. Note that in [6], [10], similar scenarios are considered, but with the important
difference that only the nonrobust ergodic secrecy rate maximization problem is investigated.
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82) Scenario 2: Perfect LCSI and imperfect ECSI: Consider the scenario where Eves are
regular users of the system, but the cooperation between Alice and Eves is limited so that Alice
only has some imprecise knowledge about the channel to Eves:
gk = ĝk +∆gk, ∀k ∈ K, (8)
where ĝk ∈ CNt is the estimated CSI, ∆gk is the stochastic CSI errors, following the distribution
∆gk ∼ CN (0,Ee,k), with Ee,k ≻ 0. Such uncertainty model has been considered in [23], but
with a different design objective (minimize the outage probability) and only a single Eve.
3) Scenario 3: Imperfect LCSI and imperfect ECSI: We consider the case in which Eves are
parts of the communication system [2], [5]. Differently from the previous case, we model the
CSIs for both Bob and Eves as being imperfect [19]:
h = ĥ + ∆h, gk = ĝk + ∆gk, ∀k ∈ K, (9)
where ĥ ∈ CNt and ĝk ∈ CNt are the estimated CSI; ∆h and ∆gk are the corresponding
stochastic CSI errors, which respectively follows the distribution ∆h ∼ CN (0,Eb), Eb ≻ 0,
and ∆gk ∼ CN (0,Ee,k), Ee,k ≻ 0.
Remark 1 (Choice of error models): We have used Gaussian random vectors to model the
imperfect CSI in Scenario 2 and 3. The reason that we choose such model as opposed to
characterizing the error as bounded random variables (see, e.g., [30]) is given below. In the
process of acquiring the CSI by the Alice, there are two main sources of CSI errors: the estimation
error and the quantization error. We consider the case that the estimation is not very accurate
but the amount of bits available for feeding back the CSI (which determine the size of the
quantization codebook) is sufficient. Therefore the estimation error is the dominant factor for
the uncertainty of the CSI. It is known that when estimating channels using the MMSE method,
the CSI errors tend to follow Gaussian distribution. We mention that the above model has already
been used in [30]–[34] to model CSI errors arise in other communication systems.
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9C. Problem Formulation
In all the uncertainty models presented above, limited CSI knowledge makes it difficult to
design a transmit strategy that is able to guarantee a given rate target R > 0 all the time.
Fortunately, in practice many wireless applications (such as video streaming, voice over IP)
are able to tolerate occasional events of outage without significantly affecting users’ QoS [23].
Therefore it is reasonable to design transmit strategies that can meet the users’ rate requirement
with a high probability. Formally, we are interested in solving the following chance constrained
program (which is a modification of problem (6))
max
w,R
R (10a)
s.t.Pr
{
log2
(
1 +
∥∥hHw∥∥2
δ2b
)
− log2
(
1 +
∥∥gHk w∥∥2
δ2e,k
)
≥ R
}
≥ 1− pk,out, ∀k ∈ K, (10b)
‖w‖2 ≤ P, (10c)
where pk,out ∈ (0, 1] is the maximum allowable secrecy outage probability for the kth Eve.
The chance constrained robust beamforming design (10) is non-convex, and thus is not likely
to be solved efficiently. To make the problem tractable, we first decompose (10) into a sequence
of probability constrained power minimization problems, one for each target rate R > 0:
min
w
‖w‖2 (11a)
s.t.Pr
{
log2
(
1 +
∥∥hHw∥∥2
δ2b
)
− log2
(
1 +
∥∥gHk w∥∥2
δ2e,k
)
≥ R
}
≥ 1− pk,out, ∀k ∈ K. (11b)
Obviously, the optimal objective value of the above problem is monotonically increasing with
respect to Ropt. Thus, by solving the problem (11) with different R and using a bisection search
[35] over R, Ropt can be obtained. In the subsequent sections, we will focus on solving (11) for
different uncertainty models.
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III. PROPOSED METHODS
A. Scenario 1: Perfect LCSI and statistical ECSI
In this scenario, only the statistical ECSI of the form gk ∼ CN (0,Gk) , ∀k ∈ K is known to
Alice. Therefore the left hand side of the constraint (11b) can be reformulated as
Pr
{
log2
(
1 +
∥∥hHw∥∥2
δ2b
)
− log2
(
1 +
∥∥gHk w∥∥2
δ2e,k
)
≥ R
}
=Pr
{
log2
(
1 +
wHhhHw
δ2b
)
− log2
(
1 +
wHgkg
H
k w
δ2e,k
)
≥ R
}
(12a)
=Pr
{
δ2e,k
(
δ2b +w
HhhHw
)
δ2b
(
δ2e,k +w
Hgkg
H
k w
) ≥ 2R} (12b)
=Pr
{
wHgkg
H
k w ≤ δ2e,k
(
δ2b +w
HhhHw
δ2b2
R
− 1
)}
(12c)
=1− exp
(
δ2e,k
wHGkw
(
1− δ
2
b +w
HhhHw
δ2b2
R
))
. (12d)
The equality in (12d) holds true due to the fact that the random variable wHgkgHk w follows
exponential distribution with mean wHGkw [36].
Substituting (12d) into (11b), we have
1− exp
(
δ2e,k
wHGkw
(
1− δ
2
b +w
HhhHw
δ2b2
R
))
≥ 1− pk,out, (13)
which is equivalent to
δ2e,k
(
1− 1
2R
)
≤ wH
(
Gk ln pk,out +
δ2e,k
δ2b2
R
hhH
)
w. (14)
We conclude that for scenario 1, the problem (11) is equivalent to the following deterministic
problem:
min
w
‖w‖2 (15a)
s.t. wH
(
Gk ln pk,out +
δ2e,k
δ2b2
R
hhH
)
w ≥ δ2e,k
(
1− 1
2R
)
, ∀k ∈ K, (15b)
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The above problem is a nonconvex quadratically constrained quadratic problem (QCQP), where
the nonconvexity comes from the (possibly indefinite) quadratic constraints (15b). The following
series of results characterize its feasibility conditions.
Proposition 1: For scenario 1, when there is a single eavesdropper (i.e., K = 1), the
necessary and sufficient condition for problem (15) to be feasible is ρ (Λ) > 0, where Λ ,
G1 ln pk,out +
δ2e,1
δ2
b
2R
hhH . When condition ρ (Λ) > 0 is satisfied, the optimal solution to (15) is
w⋆ =
√
δ2e,1(1− 12R )
ρ(Λ)
vmax, where vmax denotes the normalized eigenvector of Λ associated with
ρ (Λ).
Proof: We first show that if ρ (Λ) > 0 holds true, then problem (15) is feasible. Let
w = lvmax, and we have
wH
(
G1 ln pk,out +
δ2e,1
δ2b2
R
hhH
)
w = l2vHmaxΛvmax = l
2ρ (Λ) . (16)
Since ρ (Λ) > 0, obviously the constraint (15b) will be satisfied by increasing l. Hence we can
obtain a feasible solution w.
Next, we show the reverse direction of the claim, that if problem (15) is feasible, then ρ (Λ) > 0
is true. If ρ (Λ) ≤ 0, we have G1lnpk,out + δ
2
e,1
δ2
b
2R
hhH  0. Then the left hand side of constraint
(15b) is
wH
(
G1lnpk,out +
δ2e,1
δ2b2
R
hhH
)
w ≤ 0, ∀ w. (17)
For R > 0, the right hand side of constraint (15b) is
δ2e,1
(
1− 1
2R
)
> 0. (18)
Hence the constraint (15b) cannot hold, which is a contradiction. Therefore, when K = 1, the
problem (15) under the scenario 1 is feasible if and only if ρ (Λ) > 0.
Finally, we show that the optimal solution can be expressed as w =
√
δ2e,1(1− 12R )
ρ(Λ)
vmax. Consider
the following inequality: wHΛw ≤ ρ (Λ) ‖w‖2, where the equality is achieved when w is an
eigenvector of Λ corresponding to the maximum eigenvalue ρ (Λ). On the other hand, if constraint
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(15b) is satisfied, we must have ρ (Λ) ‖w‖2 ≥ δ2e,1
(
1− 1
2R
)
. Therefore, the minimum value of
the objective function is ‖w‖2 = δ
2
e,1(1− 12R )
ρ(Λ)
and the optimal solution is w⋆ =
√
δ2e,1(1− 12R )
ρ(Λ)
vmax.
Proposition 2: For scenario 1 with multiple eavesdroppers (i.e., when K > 1), problem (15)
is feasible if the following holds true
δ2e,k
δ2b2
R
‖h‖4 ≥ −ρ (Gk) ‖h‖2lnpk,out − δ2e,k
(
1− 1
2R
)
, ∀k ∈ K. (19)
Moreover, if problem (15) is feasible, then we must have
ρ
(
Gk ln pk,out +
δ2e,k
δ2b2
R
hhH
)
> 0, ∀k ∈ K. (20)
Proof: Please see Appendix A for proof.
For K = 1, we have shown in Proposition 1 that problem (15) admits closed-form solution.
However, for K > 1, such closed-form solution is not likely to exist, because general nonconvex
QCQP problems are NP-hard [37]. Fortunately, due to some special structures of problem (15),
its global optimal solution can still be obtained in polynomial time. In the following, we use the
SDR approach for such purpose.
To this end, we first rewrite the problem (15) equivalently as
min
W
Tr (W) (21a)
s.t.Tr
((
Gk ln pk,out +
δ2e,k
δ2b2
R
hhH
)
W
)
≥ δ2e,k
(
1− 1
2R
)
, ∀k ∈ K, (21b)
W  0, rank (W) = 1. (21c)
Dropping the rank constraint, we obtain the following relaxed convex program
min
W
Tr (W) (22a)
s.t.Tr
((
Gk ln pk,out +
δ2e,k
δ2b2
R
hhH
)
W
)
≥ δ2e,k
(
1− 1
2R
)
, ∀k ∈ K, (22b)
W  0, (22c)
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whose optimal solution can be efficiently obtained by interior-point algorithms [38], [39]. Gener-
ally speaking, there is a positive gap between the optimal objective value of the original problem
and its rank-relaxed counterpart, as there is no guarantee that the solution for the relaxed problem
is of rank one. However, below we show that in our case, the solution of (22) is indeed of rank
one. That is, there is no loss of optimality in performing the relaxation.
Theorem 1: Suppose R > 0, and that problem (22) is feasible. Then the optimal solution of
the problem (22) must be of rank one.
Proof: Please see Appendix B for proof.
B. Scenario 2: Perfect LCSI and imperfect ECSI
In this subsection, we solve the power minimization problem (11) under the assumption of
perfect LCSI and imperfect ECSI. The main approach we will employ is a relaxation-restriction
procedure1: we first perform an SDR to lift the problem into a high dimension (the relaxation
step), and then conservatively transform the resulting chance constraint into a deterministic form
(the restriction step).
1) Semidefinite Relaxation: We first reformulate the chance constraint in (11b). Specifically,
the inequality
log2
(
1 +
wHhhHw
δ2b
)
− log2
(
1 +
wHgkg
H
k w
δ2e,k
)
≥ R (23)
can be rewritten as
2−Rδ2e,k
(
δ2b +w
HhhHw
) ≥ δ2b (δ2e,k +wHgkgHk w) , (24)
1Similar relaxation-restriction procedure was also used in [29], but for the purpose of handling the outage constrained MISO
downlink beamformer design problem. In contrast, in our work we apply the procedure to solve the outage constrained secure
transmission problem with different the Bernstein-type Inequality to handle the chance constraints. Furthermore, we propose the
Projection Approximation Procedure to tackle non rank-one solution case.
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which can be further rewritten as
2−Rδ2e,k
(
δ2b + h
HwwHh
) ≥ δ2b (δ2e,k + gHk wwHgk) . (25)
Define W , wwH , and plug in the definition of imperfect ECSI (8) in (25), we obtain
δ2e,k +∆g
H
k W∆gk + 2Re
(
∆gHk Wĝk
)
+ ĝHk Wĝk ≤
2−Rδ2e,k
δ2b
(
δ2b + h
HWh
)
. (26)
It follows that problem (11) can be equivalently reformulated as
min
W
Tr (W) (27a)
s.t.Pr
{
∆gHk W∆gk + 2Re
(
∆gHk Wĝk
)
+ ĝHk Wĝk−
2−Rδ2e,k
δ2b
(
δ2b + h
HWh
)
+ δ2e,k ≥ 0
}
≤ pk,out, ∀k ∈ K, (27b)
W  0, rank (W) = 1. (27c)
Using the SDR approach, we relax problem (27) by again dropping the rank constraint
rank (W) = 1. The rank relaxed problem becomes
min
W
Tr (W) (28)
s.t. (27b), W  0.
Observe that the constraint (27b) is still a difficult chance constraint. In the following, we
transform such chance constraint into a deterministic form by utilizing the Bernstein-type in-
equality I [26], [27].
2) Conservative Transformation: Let us rewrite the CSI error as ∆gk = E1/2e,k xe,k where
xe,k ∼ CN (0, I). Then, the chance constraint (27b) can be represented as follows
Pr
{
xHe,kAe,kxe,k + 2Re
{
xHe,kae,k
} ≥ ce,k} ≤ pk,out, ∀k ∈ K, (29)
where we have defined Ae,k , E1/2e,kWE
1/2
e,k , ae,k , E
1/2
e,kWĝk, and ce,k ,
2−Rδ2
e,k
δ2
b
(
δ2b + h
HWh
)−
ĝHk Wĝk − δ2e,k.
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The Bernstein-type inequality I, stated below, is used to bound the tail probability of quadratic
forms of Gaussian variables involving matrices.
Lemma 1 (The Bernstein-type Inequality I) [26], [27] Let G = xHAx + 2Re{xHa},
where A ∈ CN×N is a complex hermitian matrix, a ∈ CN , and x ∼ CN (0, I). Then for any
σ ≥ 0, we have
Pr
{
G ≥ Tr (A) +
√
2σ
√
‖vec (A)‖2 + 2‖a‖2 + σs+ (A)
}
≤ exp(−σ), (30)
where s+ (A) = max {λmax (A) , 0} with λmax (A) denotes the maximum eigenvalue of matrix
A.
With the Bernstein-type inequality I, the chance constraint (29) can be conservatively trans-
formed into the following deterministic form:
Tr (Ae,k) +
√
2σe,k
√
‖vec (Ae,k)‖2 + 2‖ae,k‖2 + σe,ks+ (Ae,k)− ce,k ≤ 0, ∀k ∈ K, (31)
where σe,k = − ln (pk,out). That is, if (31) is true, then the chance constraint (29) must hold true.
Consequently, the relaxed problem (28) is now conservatively reformulated as
min
W
Tr (W) (32)
s.t. (31), W  0.
It is easy to see that the above problem is equivalent to the following problem
min
W
Tr (W) (33)
s.t. Tr (Ae,k) +
√
2σe,kµe,k + σe,kve,k − ce,k ≤ 0, ∀k ∈ K,∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
vec (Ae,k)
√
2ae,k
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ µe,k, ∀k ∈ K,
ve,kI−Ae,k  0, ve,k ≥ 0∀k ∈ K,
W  0,
October 29, 2013 DRAFT
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Algorithm 1: Projection Approximation Procedure
1.Let P denote the project matrix of vector W1/2h, where P = W
1/2
h(W1/2h)H
‖hW1/2‖2
;
2. We construct a new rank one solution Ŵ = W1/2PW1/2;
3. By SVD method, we can obtain w∗ from Ŵ.
where µe,k and ve,k, ∀k ∈ K, are slack variables. This problem has a linear objective, and it
includes K linear constraints, K second order cone constraints and K+1 convex PSD constraints.
Therefore it is a convex problem and can be solved by using off-the-shelf convex optimization
solvers, such as CVX [39]. However, due to the rank relaxation, there is no guarantee that the
resulting optimal solution Wopt is feasible for the original problem (27). To obtain a feasible rank-
one solution w∗, we propose a simple Projection Approximation Procedure, which is summarized
in Algorithm 1. Surprisingly, this simple scheme is guaranteed to find a rank-1 solution which
has performance no worse than Wopt.
Proposition 3: Let Wopt denote the optimal solution of problem (33). If Rank(Wopt) > 1, then
the Projection Approximation Procedure can provide a rank-one solution Ŵ with the following
performance guarantee: Tr
(
Ŵ
)
≤ Tr (Wopt).
Proof: Please see Appendix C for proof.
Remark 2 (The relaxation-restriction procedure): The feasible region for the original proba-
bility constrained problem (27) is nonconvex. The relaxation step expands the feasible region to
a larger, albeit still nonconvex set. By using the Bernstein-type inequality I, the latter set shrinks
to a convex set (the shaded region in Fig. 2), defined by Eq. (31), thus the restricted problem
becomes a convex one (33). Proposition 3 states that, remarkably, the Projection Approximation
Procedure is able to find a feasible solution w∗ in the original feasible region that is at least as
good as the solution Wopt of the restricted convex problem (33).
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Fig. 2. Graphical representation of the relaxation restriction procedure.
C. Scenario 3: Imperfect LCSI and imperfect ECSI
In this subsection, we discuss problem (11) when the knowledge of both LCSI and ECSI are
imperfect. Note that in this scenario, multiple types of independent CSI errors are included in each
chance constraint. The resulting problem is different, and arguably more difficult, compared with
the problem considered in the previous scenario, where each constraint involves only a single
type of CSI error. Our main approach is again the relaxation-restriction procedure used in the
previous subsection. However, in the restriction step a different form of Bernstein-type inequality
needs to be used.
1) Semidefinite Relaxation: Using the imperfect CSI model (9), problem (11) can be equiv-
alently reformulated as:
min
W
Tr (W) (34a)
s.t.Pr
([
∆hH ,∆gHk
]
diag
{
1
δ2n
W,− 2
R
δ2e,k
W
}[
∆hH ,∆gHk
]H
+ 2Re
{[
∆hH ,∆gHk
]
diag
{
1
δ2n
W,− 2
R
δ2e,k
W
}[
ĥH , ĝHk
]H}
+
[
ĥH , ĝHk
]
diag
{
1
δ2n
W,− 2
R
δ2e,k
W
}[
ĥH , ĝHk
]H
≥ 2R − 1
)
≥ 1− pout, ∀k ∈ K, (34b)
W  0, rank (W) = 1, (34c)
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where W = wwH . Again we obtain the following relaxed problem of (34), by dropping the
rank constraint:
min
W
Tr (W) (35)
s.t. (34b), W  0.
Next we transform the chance constraint (34b) into a deterministic form. To this end, let
us rewrite the CSI error as ∆h = E1/2b xh, and ∆gk = E
1/2
e,k xe,k where xh ∼ CN (0, I) and
xe,k ∼ CN (0, I). Further define x˜k ,
[
xHh ,x
H
e,k
]H
, ∀k ∈ K. Then, the chance constraint (34b)
can be written as
Pr
(
x˜Hk Akx˜k + x˜
H
k ak ≤ ck
) ≤ pout, ∀k ∈ K (36)
where Ak , diag
{
1
δ2n
E
1/2
s WE
1/2
s ,− 2
R
δ2
e,k
E
1/2
e,kWE
1/2
e,k
}
, ak , diag
{
1
δ2n
E
1/2
s W,− 2Rδ2
e,k
E
1/2
e,kW
}[
ĥH , ĝHk
]H
,
and ck , 2R −
[
ĥH , ĝHk
]
diag
{
1
δ2n
W,− 2R
δ2
e,k
W
}[
ĥH , ĝHk
]H
− 1.
It is worth noting that constraint (36) takes a different form from (29). Thus we will need a
different type of Bernstein inequality to transform this constraint.
Lemma 2 (The Bernstein-type Inequality II) [26]–[29] Let G = xHAx + 2Re{xHa},
where A ∈ CN×N is a complex hermitian matrix, a ∈ CN , and x ∼ CN (0, I). Then for any
σ ≥ 0, we have
Pr
{
G ≤ Tr (A)−
√
2σ
√
‖vec (A)‖2 + 2‖a‖2 − σs− (A)
}
≤ exp(−σ), (37)
where s− (A) = max {λmax (−A) , 0} with λmax (A) denotes the maximum eigenvalue of matrix
A.
With the Bernstein-type inequality II, the chance constraint (36) can be conservatively trans-
formed into the following deterministic form:
Tr (Ak)−
√
2σk
√
‖vec (Ak)‖2 + 2‖ak‖2 − σks− (Ak)− ck ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ K, (38)
where σk = − ln (pk,out).
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That is, if (38) is true, then the chance constraint (36) must hold true. Consequently, the
relaxed problem (35) is now conservatively reformulated as
min
W
Tr (W) (39)
s.t. (38), W  0.
which is equivalent to
min
W
Tr (W) (40)
s.t. Tr (Ak)−
√
2σkµk − σkvk − ck ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ K,∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
vec (Ak)
√
2ak
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ µk, ∀k ∈ K,
vkI+Ak  0, vk ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ K,
W  0.
Note that the constraints of problem (40) includes linear constraints, second order cone constraints
and convex PSD constraints. Thus, problem (40) is convex and can be efficiently solved by
existing convex optimization solvers. However, the resulting optimal solution Wopt may not be
of rank-one. If this happens, then the well-known Gaussian Randomization Procedure [40] can
be applied to obtain a feasible solution to problem (40).
In Fig. 3, we briefly summarize the algorithmic steps for solving the outage probability
constrained secrecy rate maximization problem (10) for all three scenarios considered in this
work.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
To illustrate the performance of the schemes proposed in Section III, we present detailed
numerical results for all three scenarios. The results to be presented in this section are based on
the following simulation settings (unless otherwise specified): the number of transmit antennas
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Chance constrained secrecy rate maximization ˖
problem (10)
Power minimization problem (11)
Bisection method
Equivalent to 
problem (15)
Relax to problem 
(28)
Relax to problem 
(35)
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problem (33)
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problem (40)
Problem (22)
(Proposition 2, 
Theorem 1 )
Projection 
Approximation
Procedure
(Proposition 3)
Gaussian
Randomization 
Procedure [40]
Scenario 2Scenario 1 Scenario 3
By the Bernstein-
type Inequality I
 By the Bernstein-
type Inequality II
By SDR
K>1K=1
Closed-form 
solution
(Proposition 1)
If   rank of  the 
solution more than 1 
If   rank of  the 
solution more than 1 
By SDR
Fig. 3. The schematic diagram.
at Alice is Nt = 6 and the noise variance at all receive nodes are the same, i.e., δb = δk = 1,
∀k ∈ K. The outage probabilities are pk,out = pout, ∀k ∈ K and pout = 0.05. The average
transmit power is 20dB.
A. Simulation Results for Scenario 1
In Scenario 1, Alice knows the full LCSI of h, but only the statistical ECSI gk, ∀k ∈ K. In
our experiments, all channels are in Rayleigh flat fading, i.e., h ∼ CN (0, I), and the channels
of the Eves to the Alice are different gk ∼ CN
(
0, εe ×Gk
)
, ∀k ∈ K. where G1 = I, G2 =
diag {2, 1, 1, 1, 1}, and G3 = diag {1, 1, 1, 1, 0.5}, and εe > 0 denotes the value of the ECSI
errors variance.
In our first experiment, we demonstrate the robustness of the proposed design. Fig. 4 (a) plots
the empirical cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the secrecy rates achieved by solving
problem (15). Each curve in the figure represents the empirical CDF of the secrecy rates obtained
from 10000 random channel realizations. We set the target secrecy rate as R = 1 (bits/sec/Hz),
the ECSI variance as εe = 0.2, and used different outage probabilities pout = [0.05, 0.1, 0.15].
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From the figure, we observe that for all three cases simulated, the secrecy rates generated by
the proposed method satisfy the required outage probabilities constraint. Fig. 4 (b) depicts the
achieved secrecy rate versus the total transmit power, for the case where the ECSI variance is
given by εe = 0.2 (each point on the figure is the averaged rate over 1000 random channel
realizations). As is shown in this figure, the secrecy rate improves with increased transmit power
PR, but the rate of such improvement decreases. This is because in the high transmit power
region, the secrecy rate is limited by what can be achieved by of Eves’ channels. On the other
hand, Fig. 4 (c) shows that the average secrecy rate decreases when the ECSI variance becomes
larger.
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Fig. 4. (a) The empirical CDF of secrecy rate with R = 1 (bits/sec/Hz) and εe = 0.2; (b) Average secrecy rate versus transmit
power for εe = 0.2; (c) Average secrecy rate versus Eves’ channels distribution εe.
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B. Simulation Results for Scenario 2
Assume that all channels are in Rayleigh flat fading, i.e., h ∼ CN (0, I), and ĝk ∼ CN (0, I),
∀k ∈ K. The variance of ECSI error is Ee,k = εe × I, ∀k ∈ K, where the parameter εe ≥ 0
represents the ECSI error variance. The performance of the proposed design is compared against
the worst case design method [19]. For a fair comparison, we apply the evaluation methods
[15], [31], [41], [42], to obtain the upper bound of the CSI error covariance for the worst case
design method [19,Proposition 4]. We also present the non-robust method [19, Problem 16] for
comparison.
The empirical CDF of the achieved secrecy rate for the problem (27) are plotted in Fig. 5
(a). We set the target rate as R = 3 (bits/sec/Hz), set the ECSI error variance as εe = 0.2,
and set the outage probability as pout = 0.05. Clearly, the non-robust design cannot satisfy the
outage constraint, and about 60% of the rates are below the target rate R = 3 (bits/sec/Hz).
On the other hand, the achieved secrecy rates of both the worst case method and the proposed
method satisfy the outage constraint, but the proposed method is less conservative and achieves
a better overall performance. Fig. 5 (b) plots the secrecy rates of the various methods against
the transmit power with ECSI error variance εe = 0.1. Once again, the secrecy rate performance
of the proposed method is better than those of the other methods. Moreover, we observe that
for non-robust method, the rate is not monotonically increasing with respect to the transmit
power. This is because when the design does not take channel uncertainties into consideration,
increasing the power may also help improve eavesdroppers’ receptions [19]. Fig. 5 (c) shows the
average secrecy rate versus ECSI error variance εe. For the proposed method, we further compare
the Gaussian Randomization Procedure (Proposed method (Randomization)) with the Projection
Approximation Procedure (Proposed method (Projection)). It can be observed that larger CSI
error variance results in lower rate, and that the proposed method has much higher rate than
the worst case design method and non-robust method over the whole CSI errors variance range.
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Moreover, the performance of the Projection Approximation Procedure is slightly better than
that of the Gaussian Randomization Procedure, especially when the CSI error variance is small.
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Fig. 5. (a) The empirical CDF of secrecy rate with R = 3 (bits/sec/Hz), εe = 0.2 and pout = 0.05; (b) Average secrecy rate
versus transmit power with εe = 0.1; (c) Average secrecy rate versus ECSI errors variance εe.
C. Simulation Results for Scenario 3
We again assume that all channels are in Rayleigh flat fading, i.e., ĥ ∼ CN (0, I), and
ĝk ∼ CN (0, I), ∀k ∈ K. The variances of LCSI and ECSI errors are Eb = εb× I, Ee,k = εe× I,
∀k ∈ K, respectively, where the parameters εb ≥ 0 and εe ≥ 0 represent CSI error variances.
Similarly as in the previous subsection, we use the worst case design method and the non-robust
method developed in [19] for comparison.
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The empirical CDF of the achieved secrecy rate for different algorithms are plotted in Fig.
6 (a), where the target rate, the LCSI errors variance and the ECSI error variance is given by
R = 3 (bits/sec/Hz), εb = 0.005 and εe = 0.2, respectively. As can be observed from the figure,
the achieved secrecy rates of both the worst case method and the proposed method satisfy the
outage constraint (pout = 0.05), while the proposed method is less conservative than the worst
case method. On the other hand, the non-robust design cannot satisfy the outage constraint, where
about 55% of the resulting secrecy rates fall below the target rate R = 3 (bits/sec/Hz). Fig. 6 (b)
plots the secrecy rates of various methods against the transmit power with LCSI error variance
εb = 0.01 and ECSI error variance εe = 0.05. Not surprisingly, the secrecy rate performance of
the proposed method is better than those of the other methods. Moreover, we observe that the
rate achieved by the non-robust method increases at first and then drops sharply, a phenomenon
that has also been observed in Fig. 5 (b). Fig. 6 (c) (resp. Fig. 6 (d)) presents the results of
average secrecy rates of the various methods versus LCSI error variance εb (resp. ECSI error
variance εe), with fixed ECSI error variance εe = 0.05 (resp. LCSI error variance εb = 0.01). As
can be seen from both figures, the secrecy rates of all the three methods decease as the channel
error variance increases, and the proposed method yields the best average secrecy rate.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we focus on the design of robust secrecy beamforming strategies for MISO
wiretap channel. We first formulate the general design problem as outage probability constrained
optimization problem, and then develop different algorithms for computing high-quality solutions
under various assumptions of CSI uncertainties. We show that when statistical ECSI and perfect
LCSI are available, the chance constrained program can be solved to global optimality. For other
two scenarios of CSI uncertainty, we propose to use a relaxation-restriction approach that can
effectively obtain high-quality solutions for the difficult chance constrained program. Simulation
results are provided to demonstrate the superior performance of the proposed methods, both in
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Fig. 6. (a) The empirical CDF of secrecy rate with R = 3 (bits/sec/Hz), εb = 0.005, εe = 0.2 and pout = 0.05;(b) Average
secrecy rate versus transmit power with εb = 0.01 and εe = 0.05; (c) Average secrecy rate versus LCSI errors variance εb with
εe = 0.05; (d) Average secrecy rate versus ECSI errors variance εe with εb = 0.01.
terms of robustness and achievable secrecy rate.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
We note that there are K constraints, and they share the same h. In order to obtain the
sufficient condition, we first consider w = h and we have
hH
(
Gklnpk,out +
δ2e,k
δ2b2
R
hhH
)
h ≥ δ2e,k
(
1− 1
2R
)
. (41)
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The inequality (41) can be reformulated as
δ2e,k
δ2b2
R
‖h‖4 ≥ −hHGkhlnpk,out − δ2e,k
(
1− 1
2R
)
. (42)
Let ρ (Gk) denote the largest eigenvalue of the matrix Gk, then we have
δ2e,k
δ2b2
R
‖h‖4 ≥ −ρ (Gk) ‖h‖2lnpk,out − δ2e,k
(
1− 1
2R
)
. (43)
This establishes (41).
Next, we show the necessary condition. If each of the largest eigenvalue of the matrices{
Gk ln pk,out +
δ2
e,k
δ2
b
2R
hhH
}
, ∀k ∈ K is non-positive, we have
Gklnpk,out +
δ2e,k
δ2b2
R
hhH  0, ∀ k ∈ K. (44)
As a result, the left part of constraint (15b) is non-positive:
wH
(
Gklnpk,out +
δ2e,k
δ2b2
R
hhH
)
w ≤ 0, ∀ w. (45)
For R > 0, the right part of constraint (15b) is positive: δ2e,k
(
1− 1
2R
)
> 0.
Hence the constraint (15b) cannot hold, thus the contradiction is established.
Therefore, if problem (11) under scenario 1 is feasible, then the largest eigenvalues of each
of the matrices
{
Gk ln pk,out +
δ2
e,k
δ2
b
2R
hhH
}
, ∀ k ∈ K must be positive.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The Lagrangian function for problem (22) is given by
L (W) = Tr (W)− Tr (XW) +
K∑
k=1
xk
(
δ2e,k −
δ2e,k
2R
− Tr
((
Gk ln pk,out +
δ2e,k
δ2b2
R
hhH
)
W
))
,
(46)
where X ∈ CNt is the Lagrangian dual variable for the constraint X  0, and xk, ∀k ∈ K are
the Lagrangian dual variables for the constraint (15b).
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The corresponding KKT conditions are shown to be
I−X−
K∑
k=1
xk
(
Gk ln pk,out +
δ2e,k
δ2b2
R
hhH
)
= 0, (47a)
Tr
((
Ce,k ln pk,out +
δ2e,k
δ2b2
R
hhH
)
W
)
≥ δ2e,k
(
1− 1
2R
)
, ∀k ∈ K, (47b)
XW = 0, (47c)
W  0,X  0, xk ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ K. (47d)
Note that in general, (22) satisfies Slater’s constraint qualification condition: If (22) has a
feasible point, then one can prove, by construction, that there exists a strictly feasible point for
(22). As a result, strong duality holds and the KKT conditions are the necessary conditions for
a primal-dual point W,X, {xi} to be optimal.
We rewrite (47a) as
X = I−
K∑
k=1
xkGk ln pk,out −
(
K∑
k=1
xk
δ2e,k
δ2b2
R
)
hhH . (48)
Since I−
K∑
k=1
xkGk ln pk,out ≻ 0, and rank
(
K∑
k=1
xk
δ2
e,k
δ2
b
2R
hhH
)
= 1, we have rank (X) ≥ Nt−1.
Since XW = 0, we have rank (W) ≤ 1. If rank (W) = 0, then W = 0. However, the
constraint (15b) violates when R > 0. Hence, rank (W) = 1.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
To simplify notation, we assume that W is the optimal solution of the problem (33) in this
proof. Let P denote the projection matrix of vector W1/2h:
P =
W1/2h
(
W1/2h
)H
‖hW1/2‖2 =
W1/2hHhW1/2
(W1/2h)
H
W1/2h
. (49)
We construct a new rank one solution Ŵ as Ŵ = W1/2PW1/2. Firstly, it is easy to see that
the new solution Ŵ is a rank one matrix. Then let us check the value of the objective function,
W − Ŵ = W1/2 (I−P)W1/2  0. Thus Tr
(
Ŵ
)
≤ Tr (W), which means the value of the
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objective function will not increase. Finally, let us check whether the constraint (15b) is satisfied
for the new solution Ŵ. The constraint (15b) can be equivalently reformulated as
Pr
{
log2
(
1 +
hHWh
δ2b
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Part 1
− log2
(
1 +
gHk Wgk
δ2e,k
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Part 2
≥ R
}
≥ 1− pk,out. (50)
Substituting Ŵ into the Part 1, we have
hHŴh = hHW1/2PW1/2h =
hHW1/2W1/2hHhW1/2W1/2h
(W1/2h)
H
W1/2h
= hHWh. (51)
Hence, the value of the Part 1 remains the same W is replaced with Ŵ. Moreover, we have
gHk Wgk − gHk Ŵgk = gHk
(
W −W1/2PW1/2)gk = gHk (W1/2 (I−P)W1/2)gk ≥ 0 (52)
Thus the value of the Part 2 will not increase if we replace W with Ŵ.
Therefore, the constraint (15b) is still satisfied for the new rank one solution Ŵ.
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